Peter C Dawson's Economic Research and Publications:
"Intangibles exhibit zero marginal licensing cost, including cross-border intra-firm licensing of intangibles within a multinational corporation (MNC). An MNC may not realise the full profit potential of licensing intangibles intra-firm, however, under suboptimal negotiated transfer pricing schemes. Our negotiated transfer pricing bargaining structure unlocks this potential by producing an optimal transfer price and larger optimal intra-firm licensed quantity. Increased licensing of intangibles intra-firm across borders produces a greater potential tax savings/consolidated after-tax profit gain per unit of transfer price adjustment, creating a context where MNCs feel a greater imperative or incentive to move beyond legal tax avoidance toward evasion" (Abstract).
This paper is based on portions of Chapters 3, 4 and 13 of Peter C. Dawson’s book The Economics of Business Valuation Discounts and the Competitive Risk-Return Paradigm (2010, Peter C Dawson Publishing, Ridgefield, Connecticut, ISBN 978-0-9844919-0-2).
"Inaccurate damage awards for contract breach, due to inaccurate valuations, create incentives for inefficient contracting going forward, which inhibits trade and economic welfare. This paper’s purpose is to help the Court evaluate the merits of covenant not to compete (CNC) appraisals under the Fair Market Value Standard (FMVS) by understanding the underlying economics. The economic implications of the FMVS’s required assumptions form a basis for several well-founded challenges to generally- accepted business valuation practice. Substantive details, in addition to overview, make this paper an important reference for the practicing appraiser. A general mathematical CNC valuation model, including baseline assumptions for the typical CNC, is provided. A substantive, complete, and compelling analysis should accompany each departure from the baseline assumptions. While some view mathematical precision in a subjective analysis as conveying a false appearance of accuracy, disclosed input values guard against undue reliance on appraiser judgment, facilitates effective peer scrutiny, and promotes consistent value conclusions across appraisals" (Abstract).
Stephen M. Miller, Ph.D., who is currently affiliated with UNLV. Dissertation Abstract. A bound version of Peter's dissertation may be purchased at wwwlib.umi.com/dxweb, using order number 9942570 (also see the UConn Library).
retired) for an Independent Study course I took while working on my Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Connecticut. The topic of the paper is the potential microeconomic and macroeconomic causes of the persistence of the U.S. trade deficit. The original context is the U.S. trade deficit during the mid-to-late 1980s, which continued even after a large and steady depreciation of the U.S. Dollar in foreign exchange markets that began in February 1985. Its analysis and message continue to be relevant to trade deficit discussions today, since many of the underlying causes of its persistence in the 1980’s continue to be fundamental to its persistence today. Indeed, economic history can provide insight into today’s economic issues. A major contribution of this paper is the synthesis of the analysis of several potential microeconomic and macroeconomic causes of the persistent U.S. trade deficit into one general open-economy macroeconomic model, which is a modified Mundell-Fleming model. The literature review and economic analysis should be of interest to students and researchers in the areas of International Trade and International Finance (in Economics, International Finance is Open-Economy Macroeconomics). The paper ends by recommending further research into the area of a strategically-designed and well-implemented foreign trade policy on a national level, which apparently hasn’t really caught on in the U.S. (as witnessed by the continued U.S. Laissez-fair trade policy approach and adherence to the underlying notion of the preeminence of an unchecked competitive international market) with the exception of a relaxation of U.S. Antitrust policy since the early 1990’s, which arguably has occurred not as part of a coherent or formal trade policy. Perhaps an unspoken but prevailing view among U.S. observers is the recognition that various means of trade promotion on the part of our trading partners, but in the absence of similar or counterbalancing trade promotion on the part of the U.S., has some real influence on, and plays its part in, the continued persistence of the U.S. trade deficit. This paper suggests the relative absence of a formal, strategic U. S. trade policy may have led to a fundamental shift in the U.S.’s relative competitive position in world markets. It also points out that a strategic trade policy need not be protectionist in nature, but rather can be a means for U.S. trade promotion (related to this point is my March 2006 article titled “By American,” which discusses one potential element of a successful comprehensive strategic trade policy). [updated April 22, 2012] |